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Revision of American Sociopolitical History: restoring to populism its dignity

September 9, 2007 7:55 pm

 Introduction to American Radicalized Sociopolitical Movements in Informationalism and the Network Society

a working paper by

Russell Cole

After becoming versed in this typically neglected aspect to the American story [Populism and the People’s Party], I became fixated on the truly unique poignancy it deserved in any narration of American sociopolitical history; one characterized, in most every other instance, as a historical rendering that has obfuscated class; economic inequality; as well as stratifications extant within sociopolitical institutions; all of which can be conceptualized – although they rarely happen to be – along patrician and plebeian dimensions. This stratification has persisted for so long and it has had such a profound influence upon the cultural codes circulating through American social formations that it has gone unmarked in the preponderance of American discourse.

It should not be understated the impact that implicit sociocultural traditions have upon the surface reality, the veneer of American politics. As Tocqueville pointed to, Americans rarely voiced radicalized sentiments toward their sociopolitical institutions and their operations. In fact, as he considered, American democracy – in the form it assumed – might not be possible without such willing obedience among the population of America.

The deferential posture that Americans have been conditioned to assume in relation to civil and political institutions reinforces this lack of discursive treatment of a society divided along elitist and commoner lines. American history, by and large, has been accounted for under the pre-determinacy of Whiggishness, discounting enduring quasi-caste distinctions as if they are temporal aberrations, epiphenomena to an underlying narrative that ultimately tells of America’s advancement toward an increasingly democratic condition. There are, of course, notable exceptions to American Whig renditions of history, such as The People’s History of the United States. However, another treatment of these issues is by no means a contribution to an already saturated field of political sociological inquiry.

Coming to Terms with Populism

As both a result of my new interest in an organization that called itself the Populist Party of America as well as a family history - although fairly distant at this point in time - that included political participation in populism - I began researching the history of this movement, which presented itself in its fullest embodiment in the form of the People’s Party. After becoming versed in populism, I was awe struck at what appeared to be an under treated anomaly when in taken in the purview of the overall course of American sociopolitical history: a narrative that persistently omits accounts of sociopolitical and economic inequality; a lack of criticality that contributes to a facade of civic egalitarianism originally manifested in what has become the persisting mythology of Jeffersonian republicanism. This false ideology configures a conceptualization of American political relations, which neglects to recognize the influences had upon political opportunity by the material conditions belonging to the economy.

The Jefferson’s early articulation of Libertarianism exclaimed the virtues of the citizen agriculturalist; a body collectively composed of citizens who stood side by side one another in lateral sociopolitical uniformity. Thus economic class was left unconceived in the Jeffersonian account of American sociopolitical relations, and, needless to say, such an account failed to address the impact that economic inequalities, or class, had upon the feasibility of each citizen coequally affecting the public policies of the American state[4].

Populism – as it was incepted in economic affairs of the Midwestern and Southern farmer in the latter part of the Nineteenth Century – was an emergent pattern of economically directed intellectualism, which – through processes of its development – came to identify itself as a political movement with a more prodigious agenda than mere economic reform. Furthermore, it was a consequence of organic intellectual social processes. By that, populism culminated largely out of social mechanisms that existed independently from the institutional guard belonging to the Academe and other vested interests. Of course, populism was affected by Marxism, and, on occasion, in some of its expressions, it appeared proto-Marxist. However, the populist critiques of the economy and, in particular, the finance and monetary systems proved to be not only original and penetrating, but, additionally, they ultimately served as the precipitants of economic reforms that had lasting legacies.

For instance, the contemporary conceptualization of the free-market is heavily indebted to the populist movement in America. It was through populism that legislative fixtures intended to promote free-market competition, such as anti-trust and anti-monopolistic statutes, came to regulate the practices of capitalist interests. Indeed, we can go so far as to say that it was through populism that the modern conception of the free-market came about. Even more, it was due to its emphasis upon a competitive market[5] that the Democratic Party was amenable to the infusion of the populist ideology into its platform, which would come to mark its public disposition throughout the first half of the Twentieth Century. I realize that many students of American political history would delineate among the Populist era: the period when Bryan was the leading figure; and the Progressive era – associated with Wilson, as well as, the New Deal, which, of course, was the domestic policy of FDR. No matter, as John Gerring has demonstrated through a careful content analysis of American Party rhetoric, the consistencies among the three proposed eras out-weighed the significance of the differences demonstrable in the three proposed historical periods of Democratic Party ideology.

Many discount the ethical accomplishments of the People’s Party, which was the first to embrace multiple racial identities; the first to include women in its organizations, prior even to Women’s suffrage; and the first to demand in a recognizable voice the democratization of various political institutions that had been, till then, the decision-making province of political elites. Recourse to the denial of populism as an event that demonstrated advanced ethical and moral sensibilities on the part of its conceivers, promoters, and adherents is typically sought through citing aspects of the multi-faceted social critique leveled by populism, with the intended result of identifying internal inconsistencies in the populist ideology.

For instance, one of the more prevalent criticisms of populism is that it reflected a racial tolerance while, concurrently, possessing a nativist agenda. However, this criticism speaks more of the lack of analytical faculties by those who make such a claim as it points to the lack of sophistication in the populist social critique formed in reflection of the American gilded age. I am always dumbfounded each and every time I find myself explaining to detractors of populism that there is no a priori analytical relationship between nativism and racism. Although there might be empirical relationships between the two conditions, where nativists tend also to be racists, this has nothing to do with the People’s Party, per se. America was already a multi-racial society prior to populism’s emergence, and the nativist policies taken up in the advocacies of the People’s Party were not latent with racial discrimination. Objecting to undesirable immigration is not necessarily predicated upon race. Instead, as in the case of the People’s Party, it was based upon the impact that particular elements of any society might bring about if permitted to migrate to the United States.

Additionally, and this should be apparent to anyone who has expended any efforts, at all, when attempting to come to terms with American immigration – despite the conventional wisdom, belonging to American economics – which we are persistently instructed to embrace and believe – immigration does not proportionally benefit all sectors of the economy. One such group that certainly does not experience positive outcomes resulting from immigration consists of those who dwell in the middle and lower tiers of the labor market. Immigration both diminishes the value of labor in every sector of the economy to which its skills happen to apply, as well as, posing obstructions to the successful formation of cooperative institutions, either constituting organized labor, or qualifying as the financial cooperatives, such as credit unions, that leverage the monetary resources of those who are excluded from the many implicit trusts that dominate the financial industries controlled by organized-capitalism.

Indeed, the recent revelations concerning the use of Visas for the import of labor to be employed in the technology sectors of the economy reinforces the conclusion that immigration is not advantageous for labor. Despite the conventional wisdom, as it turns out, the overwhelming preponderance of Information Technology workers who are allowed entry into the United States are in the lower strata of the technocratic hierarchy comprised of Information Technology laborers. Therefore, America is not taking in the best and the brightest; rather, corporate America is merely increasing productivity by importing cheap labor that is only qualified to work in the most entry level of positions in an organization’s IT infrastructure. This – topped with the fact that wage stagnation, in recent history, has been an enduring feature of the employment market for the middle and working classes – indicates that immigration is only beneficial for those who dwell in the higher socio-economic tiers of American social relations; the ownership classes belonging to corporate America.

Another ill conceived critique of populism consists of instances where commentators remark upon the internal inconsistency of populism’s anti-statism along with many of its ‘socialist’ sentiments. It is true that populism called for the nationalization of the railroading industry as well as the banking industry. However, unlike what nearly amounts to ideological absolutism on the part of contemporary Libertarians, the populists were not constrained when devising possible solutions for social problems by a conviction that all instances of government should be curtailed, even in scenarios where the absence of government intervention appears to create a more undesirable social condition. Additionally, populism and its instances of economic cooperatives is more an expression of anarchistic sensibilities than anything approaching socialism. Certainly, no one can credibly contend that organic cooperatives intended to extricate the American farmer from his social positioning that amounted to serfdom was motivated out of an affinity of statist institutions. Indeed, it was only until such endeavors proved to be ineffective against the trusts that had been established by organized-capitalism that the populist movement became politicized.

This is not to say that populism – especially when taken up by the Democratic Party – did not come to reflect a pro-statist position on the majority of matters qualifying as issues of public concern. Nevertheless, this ideological posture on the part of Democratic populists was perceived as a necessity in order to guard against the publicly harmful excesses of what came to be called “predator elites” in the economy. To paraphrase The Great Commoner; also known as William Jennings Bryan:

Men are the creation of God. Corporations are the creation of man, and what man creates man can destroy.

In respect to this – which can be identified with less ambiguity as the regulatory measures needed to quell the popularly harmful greed of the corporation – that the adoption of a pro-statist approach toward public policy reveals its real character: Government was a device of necessity, and the pro-statism of the Democratic populists should not be conflated – in its interpretation - with the authoritarianism embodied by the Whig-Republicans and their mercantilist conception of political and economic social relationships.

Finally, what more that can be said about populism arises from an inference that is generated from mechanisms that are alien to the processes of scholarly research, but deserves mentioning, nonetheless. The populist movement seemed to stimulate the activation of ethical dispositions belonging to the social characters of those who would come to be participate in this movement. Individuals, whose ideologies had been immured in white supremacist backdrops, eventually identified with African-Americans, as social agents with whom they suffered the exploitations engendered by common same social conditions. In fact, there are accounts of former slave owners coming to advance the causes of African-Americans by serving as chairs to African-American farmer alliances.

Therefore, rather than specifically addressing fabricated shortcomings of the People’s Party, it is more worthwhile for a student of political sociology to treat the aspects belonging to this movement that set it apart from nearly all other facets of the American experience. Specifically, what strikes the attention of the epistemic agent – who is not predisposed to dismiss the accomplishments of the various farmer alliances and the People’s Party, which they came to establish – is the fact that these dissolute, degraded, and politically inexperienced agrarians could come to mount the most redoubtable third-party insurgence to the duopoly embedded in partisan politics in the whole of American history.

Families in the Midwest and South – who dwelled in a social condition where observances of women and children afoot in bare feet was commonplace – arose from a state of sociopolitical ignorance to one of penetrating insight and criticism upon American social relations. Even more, the political ideology developed by populists was emergent, composed from intellectual processes that were organic. Additionally, the populists were faced – when developing this intellectual formation – with constructing their own social institutions through which their knowledge could be manufactured as well as disseminated. Journals needed to be published and circulated. Travelling lecturers had to be trained and financially supported. Financial schemes had to be creatively fostered a deployed in an attempt to coerce other economic agencies into bargaining directly with the farmer alliances, so that the trust under which the crop-lean system[6] was actualized and enacted could be overcome. Finally, populism transcended sectionalisms – which were the by-products of superficial material conflicts in American society, such as white supremacy and its opposition to African-American interests – in order for African-Americans as well as Southern Whites to attend the same gatherings and applaud enthusiastically as the political orator explained racism as an instrument used by Southern elites to deflect the attention of the farmers from their real adversaries, whom Blacks and Whites commonly faced.

The Contemporary Significance of Populism

Recently, I had listened to a service given by a Unitarian Church in New York, which commemorated the outing of the Pentagon Papers. At this service, I became audience to descriptions of the subversive inner-workings of activists responsible for the publication of these documents, which were entered into the Congressional Record by Gravel, and, finally, published in book form by a Unitarian publishing syndicate. I was struck by words that were spoken in reference to Gravel that remarked upon an aspect to American culture where Americans are taught – from the time they assume comfort upon a parent’s lap – to, “avoid looking silly,” or foolish; to avoid orating that which strays beyond the comfortable parameters of orthodoxy. According to the wisdom embedded in this shared stock of social knowledge, not adhering to such standards would render the speaker as suspect to aspersions labeling him or her as a crackpot or a voice from the margins of society to be dismissed, because he or she conveys sentiments that are outside of the recognizable: the familiar domestic environment qualifying as the mainstream.[i]

In contrast to the insightful words spoken of Gravel and his current candidacy for the Democratic Nomination, in recent weeks, I have also heard a speech given by Bill Clinton during the memorial for Arthur Schlesinger. Clinton’s - in remarks that can only be interpreted as self-congratulatory - lauded Lincoln, who had also given oratory at the theater where the service was being held, for attempting to reach out to the, “Great American center,” prior to the collapse of the Nation into civil war. According to Clinton, Lincoln’s initial attempt to avoid confrontation, by remaining amenable to slavery as long as it did not extend into new territories and states, demonstrated an understanding of the great American center and how it allows for progress to be made during intervals belonging to a larger cyclical pattern; where the mushy middle of American politics would slightly tip its balance toward the Left or toward the Right. During instances where the Left was favored, small, incremental steps of progress could be made. However, it required a savvy leader who could continue to appeal to the middle, in order to coax the Country in the right direction without inciting a backlash by introducing proposals that were too radical, which would entail too abrupt a departure from the trails that had already been worn into easily transverse paths.

What are we to make out of these two contrasting stylizations of political existentiality? It is in respect to this question - more than anything else - that has led me to firmly believe that populism has a role to play in the development of the sociology of democracy. My understandings of populism are primarily derived from the historian, Goodwyn, who possessed the uncommon tenacity for summarizing the necessary antecedents for an authentically democratic insurgency to unfold: First, a group must obtain the institutional autonomy needed to formulate a conceptualization of sociopolitical mechanisms operative in a political structure, which foments in contradistinction, and in to varying extent, opposition to the preemptive orders of knowledge and the sociopolitical institutions that are arranged under the cloak of legitimacy derived from these hegemonic discourses. However, as Goodwyn wisely points out, such a development - an alternative episteme - is not, in and of itself, sufficient for democratic insurgency. In America in particular, there is a long untreated - yet, all too pervasive - posture of deference habitually assumed by commoners in relations to the established institutional guards of sociopolitical power. Without a shaking off of the deference toward institutions of the old guard encumbering the shoulders of those - who have long been conditioned to internalize the identity of plebiscite - the provision of an alternative interpretation of the Human Condition - currently embodied in the way things stand - would fail to incite the mobilizing of masses.

According to this parsimonious and elegant rendering of the necessary conditions for a democratic insurgency to take root, Goodwyn goes on in his minor masterpiece, A Short History of the Agrarian Revolt, to catalog the events that culminated in the establishment of the People’s Party. The process that resulted in the type of psychic characteristics necessary for democratic insurgency was a slow incremental process, involving quite a few setbacks and failures on the part of the various farming alliances as they initially endeavored to extricate their members from the crop lien system, which basically amounted to a trust comprised of financial interests along with manufacturing - both of which maintained credit as well as distributional relationships with local town agents, who dealt directly with the farmers. These relationships that were established and protected by the these interests precluded the farmers from entering into the necessary financing arrangements for them to bypass the insufferable arrangements imposed upon them by the local town agents, who extorted as much as possible from the farmers each time the farmer was forced to obtain credit for the oncoming year.

It is in these considerations that Web 2.0 assumes significance. The democratization of representational spaces in civil society fosters both the intellectual autonomy necessary to form alternative sociopolitical interpretations as well as the political self-respect necessary to abandon to the deferential posture assumed in relation to the institutions of the old guard.

[1] The Green Party has associations with other Green Parties that exist in other states around the globe. However, these relationships are loosely defined and often more symbolic than anything else.

[2] The Populist Party of America is a micro-party that was incepted 2002, and is based in Las Angeles. At this point in time – with some exceptions – it is a virtual community that is radicalized. The exceptions consist of activism – involving activities such as the distribution of literature – that has taken place in the Las Angeles area.

[3] Grounded Theory is the approach that is typically assumed by sociologists who perform ethnography

[4] As Charles Goodwyn has pointed out, the Jeffersonian ideology was a major obstacle to the political radicalization of the populist movement.

[5] Free-trade was a staple of the Democratic ideology during the period when it opposed the mercantilist protectionism of the Whig-Republicans.

[6] The crop-lean system was enacted by the trust of economic relationships assumed by financial firms, manufacturers, and local town agents, who extorted farmers for as great as a share of the yearly productions of agricultural commodities by withholding credit that was necessary for the farmer to procure the manufactured supplies that were a requisite for planting and harvesting in the oncoming season.

[i] The Pentagon Papers Then and Now: Unitarian Universalists Confronting Government Secrecy

http://www.uua.org/events/generalassembly/2007/presentations/30971.shtml; UUA

Pondering the Future of Populist America as it continues to grow and increase in organizational complexity

August 9, 2007 8:43 am

As the Populist Party of America grows in size, we are faced with some challenging obstacles and difficult decisions to make regarding the future of the Party: i.e., What type of structure should be given to the Populist Party of America? Should we strive for a strong national organization? Or, contrarily, should we stress decentralization, choosing to focus on the development of state and local parties without any overbearing emphasis placed upon the integration of the various pockets of Populist America into a monolithic formation? Thus far, I have been exposed to two contrasting visions for the future organization of the Party, as it continues to grow in size.

There is an argument that maintains the necessity of an organization to possess some kind of integrated structure, which would include members who would participate in planning and problem solving. This managerial core would contribute to the development of different actionable plans that could later be introduced to the membership at large, providing some options that have already been delineated, from which the membership might select to adopt and implement as a Party platform. This proposal calling for the Party to possess a kernel, consisting of more active members, who would be inclined to offer centralized planning for the Party as a whole, stands in stark opposition to the other conception for the appropriate structuring of the Party, as it continues to expand.

This proposed design for the Party - which stands in opposition to proposals for centralization - would not provide for an organization with a centralized nervous system. Alternatively, the Party would be allowed to proliferated along lateral dimensions while failing to create an integrated hierarchy of offices.

To relate this ideology of decentralized politic to contemporary sociological literature, the jargon that has come into fashion, as a result of the studies upon the Informational Economy, which were initiated by Manuel Castells, uses the reference, Networked Politics, to designate instances of decentralized patterns of political praxis.

This new form of political mobilization often transcends the geographical boundaries imposed by states and governments. Furthermore, Networked Politics are understood as a by-product of what has been termed by Castells as Informationalism, which simply designates the technological paradigm underlying the expansion of Internet communicative infrastructures. However, the type of sociopolitical opposition that is formed through the networking of diverse agents and groups via the communication channels provided for by the Web - despite the transnational character of these network configurations - fails to negate the embodiment of geographical locality and the coalescence of interests among advocates who reside in physical proximity to one another; thus, allowing for embodied interaction.

This condition, where localized concerns are situated and understood in the context of larger geo-economic and geopolitical social forces, has been referenced under the neologism, glocalization. This concept fits in well with the social theoretical framework that has been introduced by Castells, who discards with the global democracy thesis propounded by Habermas and Rorty - which was founded upon the notion of a cosmopolitan culture - in favor of an understanding of the globalizing trends, facilitated by Informationalism, where multiculturalism will be preserved; only such cultural differences will become circumspect within a global forum of manifold cultural identities, who will participate in a world representational space in order to express their uniqueness as well as discover the peculiar attributes of others.

It is here, in the conception of glocalization, that I propose as a guiding post serving as an indication for the appropriate trajectory in which Populist America should transverse, as the Party enters into its future stages of development, as it continues to grow larger.

[Future installment: the concretization of glocalization in the praxes of Populist America]

Russell Cole

Does Media Matter?

March 16, 2007 8:18 pm

I have been a member of an organization for several months now, which operates on a national basis and performs the task of assessing the accuracy of journalistic content delivered over sources of mass media, such as newspapers, television, and radio, called Media Matters, which can be found at the following URI:

http://mediamatters.org/

I suppose this organization does a valuable service by rendering those who distort information accountable for their dissimulations. However, more fundamentally, I wonder: Does traditionally mass media matter, in the sense that it is something that should be the target of activist resources implemented for the purpose of making these corporate institutions who monopolize, currently, sources of mass communications and the discourse they distribute more accurate and non-partisan?

As empirical research repeatedly demonstrates, the content distributed through mass media that pertains to sectors of American society is - more often than not - supportive of conservative views. This, of course, is at odds with the political ideologies possessed with the majority of journalists who - according to the survey research that is conducted - possess leftist political leanings. Nevertheless, the actual products of their work, that make it through the corporate establishments responsible for rendering the news, are often endorsements of conservative policies; especially with respect to the economy and the proffered descriptions concerning the health of the economy; reports of which often only integrate into the analyses indexes that reflect the state of the economy for investors while neglecting to include aspects of the economy relevant to laborers, such as wage growth; or, contrarily, wage stagnation, which happened to be an aspect of the economy stretching back to the 1990’s that was, more times than not, omitted from reports and analyses introduced by sources of journalism.

Conservative elements in society have for quite some time complained that journalism in this country was liberally biased. In their self proclaimed effort to counteract this ideological slant, they have created institutions serving as media outlets, which are decidedly conservative, despite their professed devotion to the dissemination of journalism that is, ‘fair and balanced.’ In fact, for many of us, who suffered through the prelude to the war with Iraq, the conservative slant to journalism prevalent in mass media has become a matter that is increasingly noticeable and, even, vexing to the point of agitation.

Consequently, advocates for more responsible journalism - which fails to bow down to those in power; or ceases to understand itself, and operate accordingly, in a modality that reflects a particular sociopolitical ideology’s interests by reverberating talking points and other forms of communications that qualify as propaganda; certainly not journalism. Subsequently, major national affiliations, such as Media Matters, have been created by the Left in opposition to the present state of journalism, which seems to be increasingly the conduits for press releases by conservative institutions in society.

However, returning to the question originally posed in this brief essay - does media matter? - I have to question whether these types of strategies oriented toward affecting the corporate institutions responsible for the dissimulation of conservatively slanted journalism - in some instances, blatant propaganda - is the best use of resources. We, here, at the Populist Party of America have taken a different route toward publicizing our cause - differing from other groups that attempt to reform and penetrate through corporate mass media - that effectively bypasses the traditional institutions that serve as clearing houses for descriptions of sociopolitical reality permitted to be distributed through devices of mass communications. In fact, we have been doing it to some degree of success, as our Internet based forms of content distribution are growing rapidly and now bordering upon the quantity of audience members and contributors - a role that we attempt to encourage among all of our audience members in a strategy that has embraced Web 2.0 and social media - that rivals more mainstream sources of information and editorial.

Therefore, reflecting upon the success that has been garnered by Populist America’s refusal to submit to the authority of the traditional brokers of media space - spaces which would never have offered any coverage for our political sentiments with which to begin - we have cultivated an audience, whom we hope to make contributors, through opportunities to publish and distribute their thoughts concerning social and political events and issues; (after all, in a democracy we should all see our selves as participants, not merely consumers).

So, I suppose, in response to the question; does media matter? the following answer is best suited: It only assumes significance if you make it matter by continuing to treat it as though it has legitimacy and supremacy over all other forms of communications. However, if you attempt to make your own media matter, then - in this age of limitless potential for publicity, ushered in by the expansion of the Internet - you can acquire an audience despite your refusal to submit to the old guard of communicative forms that are quickly becoming obsolescent, anyway.

Russell Cole [send him email]

(Revised and more Readable): Introduction to study of Web facilitated communications and their Sociopolitical Possibilities

January 14, 2007 2:33 pm

Episteme 2.0

A study in the sociology of mass media and the sociology of social movements; both directed upon the emerging venue of mass communications, referenced as the World Wide Web, explor­ing the transformation of sociopolitical possibilities engendered by the proliferation of a represen­tational space that is largely free from institutional gate-keeping devices and a means of publicity that is easily accessible and obtainable by a vastly greater proportion of the population

Forward to Episteme 2.0

Abstract

The forward of the document will outline the scope of the study - including the relationships of the research to preexisting literature, also devoted to the subjects referenced in the content matter herein. In short, the executive summary will serve as a type of abstract. However, since the doc­ument object, abstract, is typically not included in the contents of manuscripts that purport to be more than articles, the deployment of the artifice, forward, is more appropriate in this context; a document object that entails many of the same significations; however, it allows for greater flexi­bility when it comes to the duration and specificity of the content.

Scope and Objectives

This document expresses an assessment of the prospects for the Human Condition in the emerging epoch termed by Castells as the Network Society. The study is not a foray into futurism; nor, does the document constitute a relapse into the absolutism1 of historicism, and the ideological dogma that it inspires. The document and its flow of contents explores a field of diverse possibilities that are hypothesized to exist and reside in the current social configuration - which, of course, is a material and ideological formation that has connections to the past; a pro­cess that currently instantiates a field of potential trajectories that, presumably, can be actualize through the way we orient and posture ourselves in the present in order to react and contend with the contingencies arising from our historical situated-ness; thus shaping the unfolding of the future in the most informed and equipped manner, according to the aesthetics2 most desirable.

Operational Context

For the purposes of this meta-brief - emanating from and referring back onto - the document at hand, I shall attempt to reduce the complexities, which can be derived from a thorough analysis of the current transformations that are refitting society, into two contrasting - although inter-related - patterns embodying thematic qualities; one, which I interpret positively; and, one which I interpret negatively.

Most salient to any considerations concerning the material conditions that are instantiated by the emergence of the Network Society and - to be more precise, referring to the circumstances found in American social formations - are the alterations in the economic institutions forming the rela­tionships between those who dictate the terms of employment and those who are obliged to acquiesce to those terms when procuring employment. The changes undergoing the form assumed by the relationships between firms and employees are significant to the point where is compelled to reconsider the analytics typically attached to the conception of elements - as the concept has been generally understood in the context of industrial capitalism. It is not a stretch to suggest that employment is a term that should be discontinued as a reference to the non-stan­dard terms of employment suffered by skilled laborers in the Informational economy. The socio-grammatical conventions forming the family resemblance of economic institutions that have been spawned by the material conditions in which agents and the aggregates - that they collectively form -who find themselves situated in the information economy - embody characteristics, render­ing them qualitatively unique exemplars of sociality. Therefore, the referring expression, virtual employment, will be used as a designator, when signifying instances of this social phenomenon, hence forth.

In order to provide definition to virtual employment, some extended remarks are necessary: The current economic condition - informational capitalism - in its most rudimentary dimensions, instantiates an input to output dynamic that has diverged from the traditional, industrial capitalist relational function, which assumed the form of raw materials transformed into commodities. The information economy - in opposition - can be understood - in the most generic of terms - as a mode of production that involves the input of information and the output of reorganized informa­tion; a construct, which can be referred to - for the sake of clarity - as knowledge. It is important, here, to mark a distinction between organization and reorganization, because the former applies to previous designs that exist prior to the latter’s inculcation.

In order to begin to understand this - what is the most basic of representations corresponding to the processes involved in informational capitalism - the precise nature of the function embedded within this relation needs further specification: Reorganization is a transformation that differs from the concrete functions found in industrial capitalism, constituting the mechanisms included in the operations performed upon the input - raw materials - in the sequences involved in the modes of production. The reorganization of information into a form of knowledge involves a transformation that cannot be routinized into the machinery of production - unless one is to reduce the available vocabulary to strictly materialist terminology - because the invention of the mode production qualifies as the production, itself. Therefore, keeping with the distinction declared between infor­mation and knowledge, as soon as knowledge has been produced, through the function implied in the input - output relationship of informational capitalism, the reorganized information - which has been transformed into knowledge - is reintegrated into the process as the input variable, and - once again - assumes the form of information. Consequentially, by definition, the mode of pro­duction cannot be mechanized because it would lack the properties qualifying as the connotative definition of production, as it is defined in the processes of informational capitalism; namely, the innovation of reorganized information; a definition that excludes standardized procedures, because such mechanics would entail the absence of innovation.

Stepping back from what has been analytically deposited thus far, some relationships between firms and the labor that firms employ become transparent: The modes of production can be understood as the persistent reorganization of the processes embedded in the modes of produc­tion, which constitutes the mode of production, per se; consequently, exacerbating the pace of de-skilling - a term that extends, most generally, to developments that render employees obso­lete - which creates volatility in the employer market. It should also be mentioned that the reorga­nization of data additionally includes the implementation of new grammatical schema deployed for purposes of structuring the classifications of document elements; the attributes of the docu­ment elements; and the possible values that the attributes can instantiate under varying - (although defined) - circumstances; because the procedure of implementing a new form of infor­mation technology necessitates the reorganization of the work flow processes utilized by an organization; thus, such a retrofitting constitutes the reorganization of information; specifically, the information - as it is defined and comes to be defined - within the work flow of the restructured social organization.

Returning to considerations conducted upon the nature of the relationships among firms and the labor they hirer, the conditions necessitating the augmentation of new labor become transient, reflecting the events in an organization’s state of affairs, where it must transition its ordering of information in order to reflect the evolving conditions of information technology. Therefore, the skills that are acquired when augmenting the labor capacities of the firm, as it transitions to a new state of information management.

In order to explain this theme through comparison, one can reference the present trends in Infor­mation Technology management, which now relies heavily on the implementation of virtual com­puting environments, in order to test software compatibility and to leverage available resources performed within spaces of productivity - that demand no institutional restructuring and fail to entail any necessary legacies, which might be incurred if the firm had originally adopted the workers as actual members of the institution; a relationship with the significance of manifesting all of the traditional definitions of expectations and obligations associated with employment.

The more sanguine of the two contrasting themes is the intellectual product of postmodern social theory - as well as, Castells, who might not necessarily fit within this rubric - who have argued for the acknowledgment of an emerging social condition resulting from the proliferation of digitally encoded communicative technologies - the virtual spaces of representation they entail - and the existential freedom to stylize one’s persona provided for within the digital matrix from which virtu­alism manifest - subsidiaries to Informationalism can be summarized under the slogan, re-enchantment.

The allusion to Weber, in this context, is appropriate, since there there is an empirically contingent subject to processes of confirmation juncture between two states that can be marked as qualitatively distinct from one another, through reference to the following contrasting characteristics: First off, the emphasis placed upon innovation - or creativity - calls for organizational environments structured according to flexibility, allowing for production to occur when inspiration precipitates insight, leading to innovation; a state that offer definition to production in the context of informational capitalism. Industrialism, on the other hand, prioritizes scheduling and efficiency, providing for the synchronization of events - performed by machines and their human appendages. Industrial Capitalism required the orderly sequencing of events in order to successfully enact it processes constituting the modes of pro­duction. Such an organization calls for the regimentation of social activity reflecting a synchronous layout of stages included in the operations through which output was generated.

It is too soon to fully address this topic in the context of the document object - executive summary - belonging to the document structure. Nevertheless, since the reference - to which the following brief remarks point - is transparently ostensible, it can be mentioned, without too much disrup­tion, that the flow of time in the Informational Economy instantiates different schematic qualities. In fact, the flow of time can be bannered under: an asynchronous dimension to the relations among digital objects and the relationships they intermediate during interactions among social counterparts. This state of affairs, in the of electronic interchange, through which transactions occur, exchanging information, need not be sequential, and, therefore, the forms of reciprocity that transpire can include objects that are not defined by any linear processed ordering of events. In other words, communications can address data objects in a recursive fashion; an aspect of the distant immediacy that characterizes the flow of events that occur in the virtual spaces engendered by the expansion of Internet infrastructures; or, what can be referred to, using Castells’ terminology, as Informationalism; the technological paradigm related to a pattern of productivity that is defined by exemplars constituting digitized communications.

Returning to the persona that is cultivated and constructed agents assuming a presence within the milieu of the digital matrix - a social object that can be Self stylized in the context of virtual interactions with greater plasticity, options, and allowance of revisions - the existential liberties attributable to the digital matrix are related to the condition in which interactions take place: The digital matrix instantiates a field of agents that interact with one another in a disembodied state. As a result, the physical attributes that entail ascription to a particular social identity are - often in the digital matrix - stripped from the communicative affair, allowing agents to bend their identities and play in the engagements while assuming the identity and role of statuses that they might be barred from in real - according to the traditional sense - interactions. One might liken this hyper-reality to the condition that is typically referred to - in the context of social theory - as carnival.

Associated with the breakdown of social barriers in the spaces, constituting virtual reality, is the more recent development typically designated as Web 2.0. Now is not the place to elaborate in dept upon this complicated empirical phenomenon and the properties that should be extrapo­lated for instances of Web 2.0 when constructing a corresponding analytic. However, with respect to its relevancy to the state of carnival attributed to many virtual spaces of interaction, it should be remarked that Web 2.0 similarly negates many of the semiotic devices - extant in real spaces - whose conventional interpretation by social agents leads to the labeling of ascribed - although sometimes assumed - social identities. In the context of the interactions occurring within instances of Web 2.0, the negation of many real cultural attributes results in a leveling of the stratifications that mark real social processes of knowledge production. Web 2.0 - the most rec­ognizable exemplar of which is probably the popular Wikipedia - democratize the production of knowledge, rendering the representational spaces in which externalizations of proposed versions of knowledge find publicity.

The emergence of the episteme, Web 2.0, signifies an area of considerable concern for the anal­ysis expressed in this document, due to the possibilities it incurs for sociopolitical movements that have been traditionally marginalized, preventing insurgents challenging the duopoly of the legitimate American sociopolitical infrastructure from achieving only the most modest forms of success. The existing literature pertaining to this topic is sparse. However, two references to sociological subject matters - incidentally related to the problem described in the earlier proposi­tions forming this paragraph - are worthy of mention and will be treated somewhat extensively in the chapters and sections that follow: The agricultural reform movement of the latter part of the 19th Century - referred to as the People’s Party, or Populist Party - achieved substantial reforms; mostly consisting of democratizing more directly some of the electoral processes on a Constitu­tional level. Most significantly, the movement brought about the popular election of Senators.

More germane to the interests of this paper, however, are the unconventional tactics employed - to certain extents - by the movement in order to actualize some of the conditions defined by its teleology. The formation of collectivities in response to the inaccessibility of capital - a circum­stance attributed to the Gold Standard3 of currency evaluation, which had consequences for farmers, preventing them access to necessary sources insurance against the risks involved in the production of agricultural commodities. Specifically, the inclusion of this historical narrative contributes to a theme that appears to be emerging in the sociology of social movements, which has taken a detour from the stock of knowledge - comprising its long established conventional wisdom, which presumed the success of social movements to be the consequent of antecedents including the networking resources though which the movement could affect the decision-making of elites responsible for the formation and administration of public policy - in order to come to terms with developments in Latin America. Although the abandonment of the macro-oriented pol­icy strategies characterizing the neoliberal ideology of global consortium, such as the World Monetary Fund, in pursuit of local, organic initiatives certainly is a recognizable factor operative in the dynamics culminating into the mass electoral mobilization, which lead to the usurpations of legitimate sociolopolitical power by populist socialist movements in Latin America, the ability of the successful social movements to opportunize off of the Social Capital produced by activism conducted at the local level - identically - cannot be ignored4. The social movements - and this might be considered an attribute belonging to the connotative definition expressed in the sociological analytics of social movements - of course, were not social formations with the degrees of institutionalization needed to qualify them as organizations - in the sociological sense of the word - although they certainly did and continue to possess a form of organization - rather, the associations5 among agents contributing to these movements constitute - if anything - instances of networking, which, in these instances, transcended nation-states and their geo­graphical parameters.

In terms of this document, what is of primary significance, is the scope of the extension of the refitted understanding of the conditions that can lead to the success of social movements that lack the networking resources with elites who assume positions of authority in the sociopolitical structures of the legitimate apparatuses of a state. Specifically, in the context of the American state, do the virtual spaces - allowing for the formation of virtual communities - similarly generate the Social Capital necessary to spawn the degree of social mobilization necessary for populist insurrections to achieve success; a state defined by the actualization of the conditions defined in the social movement’s teleology.

The problem, as defined in this document, is relevant to the current activities typically referred to as Net-roots Activism6; a form of networking conducted through the communicative possibilities precipitated by the growth of Informationalism.

Strategy Employed

The problem - can third party sociopolitical movements in the United State exploit the current transformations taking place and reorganizing the representational spaces available for obtaining the publicity associated with mass media - is addressed through empirical studies, con­sisting of ethnographic field research conducted upon two instances of third party sociopolitical movements: a state Green Party in the Midwest and the Populist Party of America, (located, as a headquarters, in Las Angeles California). Both cases involved what has come to be referred to as virtual ethnography.

Tactics

Although the methodological specification of ethnographic research was originally conceived as grounded theory, the immersion in the virtual spaces of the Internet and their state of disembod­ied communications, led to the adoption of exploratory testing, which has been taken up by oth­ers involved in the investigation of this relatively new area of sociological research.

Deliverables

Review and comparison of these two empirical subject domains has led to insights concerning the fertility of virtual communities for the cultivation of Social Capital. Additionally - through my participation in the Populist Party of America, which evolved into a commitment where I was responsible for consultation on organizational matters pertaining to communicative strategies intended for the advancement of the Populist Party’s agenda - I have been afforded the opportu­nity to test hypotheses concerning the successful application of the communicative devices pro­vided by Internet infrastructures.

Organized–Unorganized

November 8, 2006 1:27 pm

by Stephen Neitzke

We the sovereign people are powerful beyond imagining, if we’re organized for anything. Not just casually organized for anti-war protests, flash mobs, NGOs that prop up the failed status quo, and the corrupt political parties, but formally organized into cross-country citizen action groups for every proactive anything, as well as for remedies outside the box of mega-corrupt representative govt.

A hundred years ago, such citizen organizations were driving the Reform Era — the greatest democracy movement in recorded history. Citizens then put together the greatest corruption-fighting machine ever devised by ordinary people. (See especially, “2nd Look–State Govt Unconstitutionalities Against Citizen-Proposed Law”, 08 October 2006, on my blog, DD Revival.)

Massively, seriously, formally organized outside the corruption box of of pure representative govt and its two major political parties, we can do any of the many things that have to happen so that we get our country back from the fascist superrich, corporate predators, and predator politicians. And not only get the country back, but prevent any future recurrence of a three-branch fascist despotism.

Unorganized, we’re nothing.

Organized, we can field third and fouth parties whose roles will be as minimally corrupted focus points of reform idelolgies within a national govt of direct democracy melded to nonpartisan rep govt. The DD/nonpartisan-rep-govt political dynamic is the only way to eliminate the systemic problems that led to the Bush-Cheney fascist despotism. And we desperately need third and fourth parties whose “genuine candidates” will supply the reservoir of human resources for a heavily regulated, subordinate, but still-strong representative govt.

Unorganized, we can’t reach minimal corruption — or the fascist despotism cure and preventative of DD/nonpartisan-rep-govt.

Why do you want to go on grinding your same old axes, wringing your hands, pointing fingers, doing nothing, waiting for govt to save you, staying unorganized? Why the insanity of constant repetition that always gets the same failed result in corrupt rep govt? Why put servile and failed consumerism above societal improvement — above citizen responisbility? Why do you want to be unorganized?

Organized, we could attract most of the 100 million withdrawn, non-voting citizens to help take back our country. Unorganized, we can barely attract the failed status quo’s servile of the left. Unorganized, we’re nothing.

Organized, we can form across state lines to review, question, and attack every little unconstitutional thing that our corporate-predator-owned governments are doing to us. You know that’s a lot. Unorganized, we can barely see across our towns. Unorganized, we’re nothing. Why do you want to be unorganized?

Saul Alinski’s efforts, 1940s-1970s, organized ordinary people of the left inside the system and did great things. It won’t work for us. The corruption machines won. The system is sewed up. Every traditional approach inside the failed rep govt system, that we could use to break the tyranny of fascist money-power, has been anticipated and blocked. We have to work outside the system, outside the political party corruption machines. So organizing inside the system won’t work. But Alinski had two other ideas that are still good for us. The first was — see the world the way it is — and organize. The second was — fix on the world that you want to have — and organize.

Nation-ranging citizen action groups (CAGs) can bring us that tandem vision.

Organized, we can have anything. Unorganized, we’re nothing

Organized, we can make political mountains move. Unorganized, we can barely make spit. Why do you want to be unorganized?

Organized, we can get our Reform Era legacy of constitutionally-defined, corruption fighting, direct democracy away from the unconstitutional and arbitrary controls of state govts. Organized, we have the legal power to make state govts stop the unconstitutional delays, alterations, and rejections of the constitutionally-defined, citizen-proposed law that has the power to kill corruption machines. Unorganized, we’re nothing. Why do you want to be unorganized?

Organized, our direct democracy can kill corruption machines and make representative govt strong, adding the sovereign people to the checks and balances of co-equal branches of public servants.

Unorganized, we have to sit and watch as corruption machines in all three branches of national govt collapse checks and balances, make a mockery of our rule of law, obstruct justice for constitutional and felonious criminals, privatize and negate our electoral system with fascist computer hacking, violate our Constitutional rights, commit the constant bribery of “money equals free speech” in our politics, commit felony murder against our soldiers in Iraq, commit felony murder against kidnapped detainees in a worldwide torture/murder gulag, make unconstitutional and treasonous ex post facto law to block their criminal prosecution for torture/murder in their gulag, illegally wiretap US citizen communications and bank transactions to ultimately criminalize dissent, and financially rape our nation in a hundred ways for the benefit of their globalized and stateless superrich, fatally weakening our nation for collapse in any catastrophe.

Organized, we can stop the race of fascist corporatism and the international central banking cabal into Bush’s media-hushed North American Union of US, Mexican, and Canadian fascist governing elites. Unorganized, we will just sit and watch as the treaties establishing Canusmex and central banking’s Amero currency do here what the French referendum barred from happening to the EU member nations last year.

The French 2005 referendum rejected the EU Constitution, which was nothing but an enslavement document ending all national sovereignty in the EU member nations for the benefit of fascist corporatism at its superrich owners. If we remain unorganized and Bush has his way, the NAU will set up with all of the EU Constitution’s corporate-nazi features — all of them dirty, ugly, mean, and nasty — locked up in a Canusmex treaty that we will be powerless to stop and that will become fundamental constittutional law under the US Constitution’s treaty clause.

Organized, our direct democracy and sovereign, fully independent, citizen lawmaking can end the Bush-Cheney fascist despotism, rip its unAmerican laws out of our legal fabric, imprison its treasonous constitutional criminals, heavily regulate corporations and the misuse of money in politics, prevent any recurrence of fascist despotism, and make our representative govts strong for the people. Unorganized, we’re nothing but meat on the hoof for the superrich’s slaughterhouses.

Why do you want to be unorganized?

Pick a national CAG name — CAG-USA, Direct Democracy League, I&R Federation, Citizen Law Society, Unity America, Citizens Union — whatever. Then start a chapter in your small town, city neighborhood, side of the city, local library, rural county, whatever. Claim that you are the so-and-so chapter of the national CAG name you’ve chosen. Begin organizing and advertizing your group online — and network with any other chapter using the national CAG’s name. Change your national CAG’s name if some network with a different name is attractive.

Play it by ear. Just organize, fellow babies, organize.

Stephen Neitzke [send him email] is the founder of the Direct Democracy League.  He is the author of “The State of the Republic, 1776-2004″ as well as a number of other works, which can be found at www.ddleague-usa.net and on his blog at http://ddrevival.blogspot.com/

© 2006 Stephen Neitzke

How things should be in the Green Party and how they are in Populist America

October 23, 2006 5:35 am

This letter, which was originally a Green Party correspondence, is of interest because I would contend that the depiction of the qualities missing in the Green Party are, in fact, embodied by Populist America:
Thanks Again for an Insightful Response,

I agree with you that there is a lot of consensus among the Greens, and I am wrong to necessarily interpret that as a negative indication of things to come. I just fear that the Greens, who still symbolize a beacon of hope to college kids, for instance, do not transform into a replication of typical American Leftist organizations, which entail hierarchical structures and unegalitarian methods of decision-making. These are the kind of attributes that repel the kinds of people the Greens should be trying to court.

I had envisioned the Greens as more of a gathering ground for people to meet and discuss things with one another and discover their similarities and differences; both are equally as important. I say this because it is the proliferation of social difference that provides the multiplication of possibilities for stylizing one’s own distinct existence and political persona, because without diversity with which to juxtapose one’s self with various other social elements, there is no possibility to provide definition to one’s own persona.

For example, the identity of male is inextricably tied to the identity of female; the negation of male; because without the term female the term male would void of meaning. The lexicon, male, would be identical in sense to the lexicon, humanity, for example. In turn, without the term, animal, then the referring expression, male, would be depleted of any symbolic significance. Consequently, it is the proliferation of difference that allows for unique identities to form.

On the other hand, I agree that there needs to be a large degree of solidarity or the various elements of the social groups would simply disperse, and the result would be anomie. Further, I do think that there is an association between trust and social solidarity. Therefore, the position you advocate is certainly valid, but only valid under the parameters of a limited scope, since without difference, which involves a degree of enigma, according to the somewhat alien interpretations of an alternative identity, there would be no cultural space for individuality in society.

The trick, therefore, is finding some sort of balance between these two dynamics that we have identified: difference versus solidarity and trust. I think that the incorporation of another guiding-principle is in order, so to provide some insight into the process involved in assessing the most advantageous ledger between difference and trust. I propose that we have to consider the dynamic of power, as well as, the other two elements previously delineated.

Power is associated with control. Both power and control are opposed to the maximization of agential possibilities on the part of the object of power and control. So, we already know that the identity of male is connected to the identity of female; without one, you cannot have the other. Unfortunately these binaries seem to always possess an asymmetrical power dynamic in that the positive attributes of male, to use an exemplar, are defined by the negative attributes of female: Males are rational. females are emotional. The identity of female is not determined by the voluntary decision-making of the female; rather, it is imposed upon the female by the oppressive social identity of male. This is why it is important to maintain a degree of enigma or something that conflates to a lack of trust in society. On the other hand, there needs to remain a degree of the conflicting dynamic of solidarity or trust.

The only resolution that I can see for this problematic is creation of a social space where identities are maintained, but only under the auspices of friendship; a relation which seems to evade the power dynamic included in relationships between other identities in society. This is getting far too complex, but if the differences and similarities possessed by the male-female binary are subsumed under the institution of friendship, then, perchance, there is the possibility of an egalitarian society. I do not even want to attempt to sort out the network of relations among the elements comprised by the hypothetical mergers of friendship along with all the other binaries in society, so I will simply suggest the possibility, and go no further.

That is about as good of a response that I can reasonably come up with. However, I thank you for this exchange, because you have certainly stimulated a great deal of considerations on my part, and if you care to, we can attempt to tie all the loose strings together; or, even, ponder the possible connections between or among any more strings that you suggest for contemplation. Either way, you have directed down what I think will prove to be a fruitful path.

Regards,
Russell Cole